CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper will be visiting Israel to meet with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir in the coming days, though the exact date is still not public. Due to security concerns, the IDF and the US military often publicize Cooper’s visits to Israel only after they occur.
They will be meeting as Israel and the US meet in one context, and Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Lebanon, and the US, led by other diplomatic envoys, will meet in another context, negotiating over the terms of the Lebanon ceasefire, as well as the IDF’s withdrawal from parts of southern Lebanon.
Israeli officials are likely to try to use the opportunity to draft Cooper to help them make their case before other top US officials.
However, a US official suggested that Cooper's visit is primarily to visit US forces in the area and to more broadly touch base with Israeli officials on military issues, as he does from time to time.
That said, US officials would not deny that issues related to Israel and Lebanon will arise, but they would, in the same breath, emphasize that many aspects of those decisions reside more in the political and policymaker arena.
In recent days, the IDF has fired on Hezbollah twice a day on average when Hezbollah operatives have approached IDF positions, particularly near the Ali al-Taher Ridge, one of Israel’s deepest infiltrations into Lebanon.
However, besides those low-grade, limited flare-ups, both sides have generally respected the ceasefire since Saturday-Sunday.
The IDF could begin to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon
Israel and the IDF are offering very modest withdrawals, possibly from places like Tibnin and the Ali Taher Ridge, which the IDF only took over last week. According to the IDF concept, it would withdraw from some of the newest areas it has taken over to test whether the Lebanese army will properly clean out Hezbollah from those areas.
Some Israeli officials are trying to draw a distinction between withdrawing from areas where Hezbollah would have a direct line of sight to fire on Israeli northern villages and areas where there would be no such direct line of sight.
However, the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, while disagreeing on many issues, are both pushing for a faster and wider withdrawal.
There are multiple withdrawal line options, and Cooper is likely to hone in on what Israel’s true apolitical security needs are, versus some of the populist, more political rhetoric.
Withdrawal to lines that serve Israeli security, not politics
Until May 26, Israel had not crossed over the Litani River or the Wadi Saluki area, and the IDF could initially withdraw to that prior line.
Next, there are at least three lines of Lebanese villages in southern Lebanon that the IDF has overrun, and it could withdraw to any of those lines. For example, in the fall of 2024, most IDF forces had only advanced to the first line of villages.
This could involve retreating from 10 kilometers or more into southern Lebanon back to three to five kilometers.
Eventually, the IDF might even withdraw to its five outposts, which were only several hundred meters into southern Lebanon, and which it retreated to in February 2025.
Yet, given that the IDF took four months to withdraw in that round of fighting, it is expected that any IDF withdrawals would first test Hezbollah’s continued ceasefire compliance, as well as the Lebanese army’s willingness to confront and remove Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure from the south of the country.
Negotiations will focus on managing controversial incidents
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz have given the impression that the IDF would remain in parts of southern Lebanon for many months, or even years, to press Hezbollah to disarm.
The sides are also negotiating how to manage controversial incidents that might undermine the ceasefire.
On one hand, there is a deconfliction mechanism involving Iran, the US, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Qatar, but not Israel.
On the other hand, there is heavy direct Israel-US coordination on these issues, and it is expected that there will be intense negotiation between Jerusalem, Washington, and the Lebanese government regarding them.
Prior to the most recent war, US Lt.-Gen. Joseph Clearfield was the main coordinator with Israel and Lebanon on such issues, with support from around 30 other American military officials.
CENTCOM was unsure at press time about whether Clearfield and the 30 officials would return to the same role or whether the roles would shift in some way.
Israel isn't confident that the Lebanese army can control Hezbollah
The IDF was highly skeptical that the Lebanese army would have staying power in holding back Hezbollah, given recent history. For months in late 2024, the IDF complained that the Lebanese army was afraid of Hezbollah and not nearly aggressive enough in handling issues and complaints, which Israel brought to its attention regarding the terror group’s ceasefire violations.
Then, by April 2025, the IDF told The Jerusalem Post that the Lebanese army had improved and acted on 500 separate complaints by Israel against Hezbollah.
However, already by July 2025, the IDF said that the Lebanese army had plateaued and was sinking in its resolve to confront Hezbollah.
Part of the issue is systemic since a large portion of the army is Shi’ite and sympathizes with Hezbollah as the leading force for its tribe when competing with Lebanon’s Sunni and Christian groups.
Another systemic issue is that Hezbollah is still simply better armed and viewed as more determined to fight than the Lebanese army.
Defense Minister Israel Katz is also expected to be included in the meetings with Cooper, but given his lack of senior military command background, Zamir has by far taken the lead on military tactical decisions in these types of meetings.