It has become increasingly clear, as confirmed by Israeli defense sources on Monday, that the end of the Iran war depends on whether US President Donald Trump orders a ground invasion of the Straits of Hormuz and Kharg Island (or one of the two) – or decides to end the war imminently with the Islamic regime’s chokehold on global maritime trade through the Straits included in post-war talks.

What is a complete mystery is how long the war will be extended if Trump opts for a ground invasion in Iran, even a narrow, targeted one. Will it take weeks or months? No one thinks it will take less than a few weeks if it has a chance of being successful.

US officials have been the opposite of helpful on this issue, seemingly giving inconsistent and incoherent estimates. Some have said weeks, while others have said months.

A satellite image shows an oil terminal at Kharg Island, Iran, February 25, 2026. 2026
A satellite image shows an oil terminal at Kharg Island, Iran, February 25, 2026. 2026 (credit: Planet Labs PBC/Handout via REUTERS)

Normally, it would be clear that it cannot be both, which would lead to the conclusion that one answer is just wrong. Yet, there is another possibility.

Sources have indicated it is possible that the radically varying time estimates refer to different goals and come from sources with different agendas.

The “weeks” estimate could be referring to carrying out a series of low-grade in-and-out raids along with intensified airstrikes. Such intense airstrikes were already reported on March 19.

Rising fuel costs in US

At that point, gas prices in the US had already jumped from around $3 on February 28 to $3.25 by March 5, then $3.50 by March 10, $3.72 by March 15, and all the way up to around $3.90.

If Trump ignored the Hormuz issue for the first week or two, hoping that regime change would solve the issue or that the regime’s new leaders would “surrender” and cut a deal granting him most of his war goals, by the third week of the war, he had been pressed to take military action to try to open the Straits.

But air power could only do so much in this case, unable to uncover all of the hidden spots where individual drones, cruise missiles, and sea mines could be used against an individual ship or two.

Moreover, the US could blow up 100 Iranian targets in the area, but as long as the Islamic regime managed to hit one or two large (and invariably slow) boats going through the Straits, it could maintain its chokehold and scare most other ships from even trying to pass.

This was why the headlines were flooded with details about thousands of marines on their way to the region during the third and fourth weeks of the war.

Yet when some of those marines were due to have arrived already on March 26, nothing happened, and the “weeks” prediction started to change to “months.”

This suggests that the “weeks” estimate may have been made by American political officials or some military officials who wanted to broaden the war with Iran.

In contrast, the “months” estimate probably comes from more military professionals and officials who want to end the war and avoid a ground operation, which could lead to a longer quagmire.

In addition, those estimating months could simply be referring to the possibility of taking over a small area of Iran for several months, rather than carrying out mere raids – something which could take much longer.

It may also require more troops, which would explain the delay in any invasion, even after the first round of troops was likely in position around a week ago.

These officials may also be looking at how Iran could counter such an invasion and how what might start as a simple narrow operation could eventually expand into something bigger in order to achieve sustained success and to truly secure the opening of the Straits.

Truly securing the Straits might also involve, in their view, a mix of military force followed by diplomacy, with intervals of time elapsing as the two tracks move in parallel.

One might hope that the ambiguity in the timelines is a strategic tactic in order to keep the Iranians uncertain about US intentions – though this could be a two-edged sword if the US needs to convince Iran to sign off at some point and cannot rely on force alone.

These estimations do not give hard and clear answers.

But they do give a deeper understanding of the high-stakes dynamics currently playing out on the world stage, which will determine whether the war goes on and for how long.