During Israel’s counterinvasion of Hamas in Gaza, over 10,000 Palestinians, a spike of 92%, were imprisoned from October 2023 until January 2025, the state comptroller’s report revealed on Tuesday.
According to State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, whose term concludes next month, neither the Israel Prisons Service (IPS) nor the IDF was adequately prepared for the implications of needing to arrest and imprison such large volumes of Gazans long-term.
The lack of any theoretical plans or estimates for how many Gazans they might need to arrest and imprison in the event of a longer war and how they would do so led to improper “freebie” releases of senior Hamas officials mid-war at times when Israeli hostages were still being held in Gaza, said the report.
The case of the release of Abu Samiya
On November 23, 2023, the IDF detained the director of Shifa Hospital, Mohammed Abu Salmiya, for significant coordination with the Hamas terrorists who used his facility as a command center. The report specifically flags the release of Abu Salmiya on July 1, 2024, and of 18 other senior Hamas officials at various points as especially problematic.
Englman said, “The fact that prisoners who presented danger to the security of Israel were released without notifying the prime minister in real time should be viewed with severity.”
The Jerusalem Post understands that Abu Salmiya’s release was far more complex than this summary sentence given by the comptroller.
Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) sources told the Post in real-time in 2024 that the political echelon and the cabinet had ignored the major issue of drastically overcrowded prisons and makeshift field-prison facilities for several months.
Given the absence of cabinet guidance, sufficient resources, and cell space, the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet were all forced to make a large number of ad hoc decisions to address imminent problems, with many of those decisions being sub-optimal.
Sde Teiman field detention facility
For example, the High Court of Justice criticized the establishment of the large makeshift IDF Sde Teiman detention facility, saying it led to widespread violations of detainees’ rights.
At least one IDF prison guard was convicted of abusing a prisoner, and five more were indicted in the large Sde Teiman Abuse Case, with their indictment only being withdrawn because the IDF prosecution violated the prison guards’ fair trial rights, but not necessarily due to an absence of evidence, and other possible cases are pending.
Violating the rights of Palestinian detainees massively harmed Israeli legitimacy globally, with The New York Times and other media outlets publishing long pieces about the abuse months before the IDF prosecution got involved. The report said it does not address any of these issues, as it focused only on IPS facilities, though it is not clear why this distinction was made.
Absent the High Court’s intervention in mid-2024, the abuse at Sde Teiman might have continued indefinitely.
Sources close to then-Military Advocate-General Maj.-Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi told the Post at the time that she had tried to close the facility earlier but had not succeeded. The report focuses on the errors made by the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet, which harmed Israel’s security by releasing prisoners who it says should have been held for longer.
While the Shin Bet has said it lacked sufficient guidance from the political echelon – a claim which comptroller sources sympathize with – the sources also say that the agency should have recognized that, given the unique circumstances of the war at the time, a special appeal should have been made to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the handling of the Abu Salmiya file.
Put differently, in a vacuum, the Shin Bet possibly made the right call to release Abu Salmiya, as he was not a violent terrorist and did not present a physical danger in that sense. Since he was held for seven months with no clear path to indict him, releasing him to make room for more violent prisoners was not illogical.
However, given that Hamas was holding Israeli hostages and the public relations boon the terror group received following Abu Salmiya’s return without having to give anything in return, comptroller sources said that the Shin Bet should have thought out of the box and held a special meeting with Netanyahu.
The influx of arrests slowed down the whole process
The report also said that the IDF and IPS were unprepared for arresting and imprisoning the sudden, large influx of Gazan prisoners, which significantly harmed the Shin Bet’s ability to carry out future arrests and interrogations.
In other words, if the Shin Bet had nowhere to hold new detainees, how could it arrest and then interrogate them?
Englman also said that the overbooking of Gazan prisoners in IPS facilities endangered IPS personnel.
The comptroller does not note that the overcrowding could have also increased the frequency of IPS prisoner abuse.
Regarding numbers, he said that the pre-war totals of 16,200 total prisoners and 5,200 security prisoners had jumped to 23,400 total prisoners and over 10,000 security prisoners by early 2025.
The true number of Palestinians arrested by the IDF may be as high as 30,000, but Englman did not produce numbers on the thousands of Palestinian security prisoners who were released in the first six months of the war due to lack of space or shaky evidence.
In addition, the cabinet released around 3,000 security prisoners as part of three hostage deals that it signed between 2023 and October 2025. In terms of the numbers and the shortage of space, in October 2023, the maximum number of prisoners who should have been held in the cell space available was around 14,500.
By early 2023, there was insufficient space for 3,502 security prisoners as well as thousands more non-security prisoners.
As of February 2025, 2,366 Palestinian security prisoners were still being held in IDF cells, an extended improper situation according to the comptroller and various Israeli legal officials.
Englman does not provide updated numbers for mid-2026, but the Post understands that they remain extremely high, including for administrative detention, although the rate of new arrests had already dropped significantly in 2025 as the number of active battles between Hamas and IDF forces declined.
In addition, fewer Hamas fighters generally surrendered in 2025, and multiple IDF sources indicated that it was more difficult to take prisoners when they emerged by surprise from underground tunnels near IDF positions, a significant trend in 2025.
IDF blames IPS
The IDF Spokesperson placed most of the blame on the IPS. According to the IDF, it is not an authorized organization for long-term detention and was never supposed to have handled detention centers for Gazans for anything more than a short period of time.
Further, the IDF said that it ultimately ended up running detention centers throughout the war and still does so in mid-2026, but only because the IPS lacked the capacity to carry out its responsibilities as the organization responsible for detention.
Regarding the improper release of certain prisoners from Sde Teiman, the IDF blamed the National Security Council (NSC) and the Shin Bet with the primary responsibility for choosing who would be released and when.
More specifically, IDF sources said that Englman was wrong to blame the IDF or the Shin Bet for failing to notify Netanyahu personally, as, according to law, these agencies are obligated only to notify the NSC chief, who has the discretion over whether to kick the issue upstairs to his manager, the prime minister.
The sources also blasted the comptroller for refusing to visit IDF detention facilities and, according to the IDF, for ignoring its explanations and account regarding the issue in dispute.
The IPS Spokesperson responded to the report, noting that most of the preparations and structure of the organization which the comptroller criticized, were inherited by IPS Chief Kobi Yacobi’s predecessor.
Further, the IPS said that it has made significant organizational changes in order to be more ready for a variety of scenarios and to be better tied into the broader national security apparatus.
More specifically, the IPS said that since January 2024, it has added 4,598 new cells, providing 4.5 square meters per prisoner, larger than the prior average. It also stated that another 2,472 new cells are due to be opened for prisoner use on a rolling basis over the course of the second half of 2026.
In addition, the IPS stated that another 2,472 new cells are due to be opened for prisoner use on a rolling basis over the course of the second half of 2026.
No trials yet for October 7 terrorists
Englman also took issue with the fact that not a single Hamas terrorist has been brought to trial to date for crimes related to the war. However, the government only approved a budget for handling indictments and trials of the October 7 Hamas terrorists last week on June 4.
Until October 2025, the government decided to delay any indictments or trials out of fear that it would need to trade many of the Palestinian security prisoners for the return of Israeli hostages (which it did ultimately need to do.)
This prevented the state prosecutor from moving forward on any indictments or trials.
The government’s approval of more than one billion shekels on June 4 to prosecute terrorists who participated in the October 7 massacre marked the first allocation of funding for moving the cases from the state prosecution to the military prosecution.
The legislation to prosecute terrorists involved in the massacre was passed in May, granting authority to impose the death penalty and conduct public trials for the perpetrators of the attacks at a new Jerusalem military court, which will need to be built.
The law’s proposal consists of a broad framework for implementing the trials.
The Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry stated that the framework of over a billion shekels was approved for the years 2026-2029 and that the funds will be allocated to the Defense Ministry and the IDF.
The approved budget is intended for establishing numerous buildings to implement the law, the ministries stated.
The planned infrastructure for the trials includes a court complex, prosecution offices, and an IDF headquarters facility.
Until the buildings are built and new military prosecutors and judges are appointed – which could easily take several months if not years – the cases are likely to be put on hold.
Not addressing these specific issues in detail, the comptroller concluded that against the broader historical backdrop, “Bringing to trial Hamas terrorists who perpetrated terror attacks on October 7 and during the Israel-Hamas War is a decisively important issue, from a legal, ethical, and public relations perspective. Bringing the terrorists to trial will do justice for the victims of the slaughter.”
The Post was still awaiting a Shin Bet response at press time.