High Court presses Levin over refusal to work with Supreme Court president Amit

The hearing was held after the court required Levin to explain why he should not be ordered to work with Amit on judicial administrative appointments that, by law, require cooperation between the justice minister and the Supreme Court president.

The case is now at the stage in which the court is considering whether to issue a binding order requiring Levin to act.

At the center of the dispute are appointments that do not go through the Judicial Selection Committee, but require agreement between the justice minister and the Supreme Court president: Appointments of court presidents and vice presidents, senior registrars, acting judges, and judges or retired judges to parole committees.

Levin has refused to recognize Amit as Supreme Court president, arguing through his privately retained attorney, Yoram Sheftel, that the position is currently vacant. He has claimed that Amit’s appointment is invalid because the Judicial Selection Committee session in which he was chosen was held without the required quorum, because Levin did not publish Amit’s appointment in the official gazette, and because Levin did not sign Amit’s appointment certificate alongside President Isaac Herzog.

The justices repeatedly challenged that argument.

Justice Ofer Grosskopf noted that other appointments made during the same committee meeting - including that of Justice Noam Sohlberg as deputy Supreme Court president - were published by Levin and treated as valid. If Levin’s quorum argument is correct, Grosskopf asked, would that not mean the minister knowingly published appointments he believed were illegal?

Sheftel responded that it was possible Levin had only later understood he was mistaken regarding the quorum issue.

Justice Yechiel Kasher warned that Levin’s position would effectively give a veto to a minority of committee members, who could refuse to attend a meeting and thereby paralyze the committee’s work.

Grosskopf also questioned Levin’s reliance on the absence of publication in the gazette and the absence of a confirming signature, saying the argument appeared circular: Levin was saying he could not exercise his authority because he had not exercised his authority.

Justice Alex Stein pressed the point further, asking whether, under Levin’s position, a law approved by the Knesset would fail to enter into force if the president, prime minister, or Knesset speaker refused to sign it.

Representing the attorney-general’s position, attorney Omri Epstein told the court that Levin’s refusal to cooperate with Amit has no legal basis and that the appointment itself did not depend on Levin’s ceremonial signature.

Epstein said Levin’s proposed alternatives - including steps that would bypass Amit or rely instead on Sohlberg - were unlawful because they would allow the justice minister to take powers assigned by law to the Supreme Court president.

The state’s position, as submitted by Baharav-Miara, is that Levin’s policy of noncooperation “lacks any legal basis,” violates proper governance and basic rules of administrative law, and harms the Israeli public by leaving needed judicial posts unfilled.

The sharpest exchange came when Sheftel suggested that, as a practical solution, Amit could transfer the relevant powers to Sohlberg.

Grosskopf responded that the heart of the case was separation of powers.

Describing Levin’s position, Grosskopf said, “the justice minister will be able to determine who stands at the head of the judicial branch.”

He added, “that is separation of powers according to the minister.”

He pointed out that Levin appeared to be saying he was willing to recognize Sohlberg, but not Amit.

“The justice minister will hold the functioning ability of the judiciary by the throat unless it accepts his choice of Sohlberg as the one who stands at its head,” Grosskopf summarized.

Sheftel denied that this was Levin’s position, but said that Amit should still transfer his powers to Sohlberg in order to resolve the deadlock.

Kasher then framed Levin’s position as one in which the justice minister had created a crisis and was asking the judiciary to solve it by giving in.

According to Kasher, Levin was effectively saying: “I created a catastrophe, so save the judicial system, the hostage, by giving up and doing what I want.”

Sheftel answered: “You understood correctly,” adding that after a year and a half of deadlock, the parties should be practical.

Kasher replied that when one side causes serious damage and then demands that the other side be “practical” by accepting its terms, “there are names for that, and out of respect for the justice minister I will not say them.”

Attorney Hagai Kalai, representing Zulat, argued that Levin could not decide to ignore the binding legal position of the attorney-general and the rulings of the court while waiting for future proceedings to run their course.

“This is a method of action that leads to anarchy,” Kalai said, arguing that an administrative authority must act according to law, not according to its own view of whether a court ruling was correct.

The broader significance of the case goes beyond the personal dispute between Levin and Amit. Dozens of judicial administrative appointments have been delayed, including 27 vice president positions, according to the state’s representative. The petitioners argue that the paralysis affects the day-to-day functioning of courts and, by extension, the public’s access to justice.

The case also places the High Court at the center of a constitutional confrontation over whether a minister may refuse to recognize the head of another branch of government and thereby prevent that branch from carrying out statutory functions.