As Israelis headed to the polls, domestic debate largely overlooked a key question: How much could new leadership change Israeli foreign policy? At first glance, very little.
Since October 7, 2023, Israelis have expected their government to confront threats before they reach the country’s doorstep. Those security priorities are unlikely to change soon; what may change is how Israel pursues them.
The current government has too often failed to turn military gains into durable political arrangements. A successor less dependent on the far-right could rebuild international trust and pair force more effectively with diplomacy.
Regarding Iran, the basic posture is unlikely to change.
A successor government would inherit deep distrust of Tehran and strong pressure to maintain a hard line. That would leave limited political room for negotiations, while the need to coordinate with Washington would continue to shape Israel’s military options. Israel is therefore likely to keep up pressure on Tehran, with close US coordination on military action.
Distrust also constrains policy toward the Palestinians. Many Israelis view the 2005 Gaza withdrawal and Hamas’s 2007 takeover as warnings about territorial concessions. Although Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has condemned the October 7 attacks, distrust of the PA persists.
Washington says payments to convicted attackers and their families continue despite announced reforms. A successor would be unlikely to pursue a comprehensive peace agreement or major territorial concessions in the near term.
That need not preclude practical cooperation: security coordination with the PA continued during the war, even under Israel’s most right-wing government, and is likely to endure. Settlement construction is also likely to continue where a successor coalition sees broad political backing or a security rationale.
Gaza is the clearest test. A new government could combine military operations to defeat Hamas in the areas it still controls with diplomacy to strengthen Palestinian civilian institutions and build a credible alternative to Hamas rule.
The United Arab Emirates already participates in the Gaza Executive Board and supports the Palestinian committee established to administer Gaza. Working with the Emirates, Morocco, and other partners, a successor could help these arrangements take hold by enabling Palestinian administrators to exercise real authority.
Jewish extremist violence is another area where a new coalition could make a difference. The current government bears some of the responsibility for the violence. It has too often minimized the problem, while some ministers have given political support to extremists, despite repeated warnings from Israel’s intelligence and security services.
A coalition less dependent on National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich could end that political support and give security and law enforcement authorities stronger backing to confront the perpetrators.
That could enable a West Bank policy focused on protecting civilians, enforcing the law at agricultural settlement outposts, and reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians.
A new government could repair Israel's standing
Lebanon and Syria offer scope for progress through security arrangements, even without formal peace.
In Lebanon, a successor could work with Washington and Beirut to consolidate the US-brokered framework signed in June. The task would be to make those commitments effective on the ground, while maintaining a hard line toward Hezbollah and demanding clear security guarantees before withdrawing from southern Lebanon.
A coalition less dependent on the far-right might have more room to pursue that goal. Hezbollah’s weakened position and continued US engagement could help, although Lebanon’s ability to enforce its commitments would remain crucial.
An agreement with Lebanon would also face fewer domestic obstacles than territorial compromise in the West Bank, with its Israeli settlements and deep historical and religious significance for many Israelis.
In Syria, a full peace agreement remains unlikely. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has reaffirmed Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, and an Israeli government would be reluctant to relinquish territory it regards as vital to security. Syria’s civil war and October 7 have deepened that reluctance.
Even so, a successor might build on existing talks to pursue practical security understandings and expand quiet cooperation where interests overlap.
Saudi Arabia remains the biggest diplomatic prize – and one of the hardest to secure. Before October 7, Israel and Saudi Arabia appeared close to an agreement extending the Abraham Accords. Normalization has since grown more difficult.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman must weigh regional security interests against the political cost of ties with Israel, and Riyadh has explicitly linked normalization to Palestinian statehood. Shared threats from Iran and the Houthis give the two countries reasons to cooperate.
A successor would still need to determine what commitments on the Palestinian issue it could offer Riyadh. Whether the two sides could bridge that gap, and whether US President Donald Trump would invest in doing so, remains uncertain.
These openings depend in part on Israel’s standing abroad, which a new government could begin to repair. A stronger response to Jewish extremist violence and the departure of ministers such as Ben-Gvir could help restore confidence in Israel’s leadership and make international partners more receptive to its diplomatic initiatives.
That goodwill could matter most in Washington. A new government could work to rebuild support across party lines and among Americans alienated by its predecessor’s policies. The close relationship between Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has partly obscured the strain in Israel’s broader American ties.
Clearer public diplomacy, backed by substantive policy changes, could help repair them. A successor would still confront anti-Zionism and antisemitism, even as it addressed criticism of specific Israeli policies.
The next government will have little time for a honeymoon. It must seize these diplomatic openings while preserving the security Israelis demand.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI). In the Israeli Defense Intelligence, he served as head of the Hezbollah and Lebanon Branch (2022–2024) and later as senior adviser to the director of IDI (2024-2026).