Diplomatic consequences
It’s a phrase used often by critical American Jews unhappy with the direction Israel has taken and yearning for the sandal-wearing, orange-growing, labor-union-dominated country of old: “This is not your grandmother’s Israel.”
No, it is not – and not only because the country has moved decidedly to the Right over the last 40 years.
Israel has changed in other ways as well.
It is no longer a poor country with a small population and little to offer the world beyond the Uzi and Jaffa oranges. It is a regional military and technological power with a population that would rank 13th in the European Union and a GDP per capita that would rank ninth.
Why does this matter? Because Israel today has options that the Israel of your grandmother’s era did not. When another country takes steps inimical to its interests, it need not simply protest, absorb the blow, and move on. It can impose a cost.
Restricting access in response to boycotts, bans
Take the Netherlands.
Beginning on September 22, the Dutch government will ban imports coming from beyond the Green Line. On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar responded by expelling Dutch representatives from the US-led Gaza coordination center in Kiryat Gat, which oversees ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian activity, and planning for Gaza’s postwar administration.
“Our message is clear,” Sa’ar wrote. “Those who act against Israel will have no foothold in the region. Israel will not allow measures to be taken against it without a response.”
That is the correct message.
The Dutch, like several other European governments, want it both ways. They want to take punitive, one-sided measures against Israel while retaining a seat at the table when consequential regional diplomacy is conducted. They want to sanction Israel in one arena while enjoying influence in another.
But diplomacy does not – or at least should not – work that way.
Access is an asset. Influence is an asset. Participation in shaping Gaza’s future is an asset. Israel is entitled to use those assets as leverage against governments that believe they can penalize it with impunity.
This is not diplomatic petulance. It is statecraft. Countries routinely link behavior in one sphere to consequences in another. In the past, Israel has generally been reluctant to do so. That attitude is changing.
In April, Israel barred Spain from the same Kiryat Gat center after Spain took hostile measures. The action against the Netherlands, therefore, looks less like a one-off response than an emerging policy: governments that wage diplomatic campaigns against Israel should not expect Israeli help in enhancing their regional relevance.
But there are limits. The Kiryat Gat mechanism is American-led and depends on broad international participation. Israel should coordinate these moves with Washington and ensure that retaliation does not damage Jerusalem’s interests.
Retaliation should be measured and purposeful. But those are arguments for using leverage wisely, not for surrendering it altogether.
Israel has the strength, ability to respond to action taken against it
The next test may be Britain. Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband recently called Israel’s publication of tenders for construction in E1 “an unacceptable and destructive act,” demanded that Israel halt the project, and warned that the UK would not “stand back and accept the destruction of the two-state solution.”
Sa’ar rejected both the substance of Miliband’s statement and “the patronizing tone of his words.” That description was spot on. Britain is entitled to oppose Israeli policy. It isn’t entitled to lecture Israel as though addressing a misbehaving colonial ward whose role is to listen and obey.
Sa’ar also correctly called Miliband’s statement entirely one-sided. He then laid down the principle that should guide Israel’s response: “The UK government’s decision to damage the relationship between our countries is deeply unfortunate. But Israel will not be a passive victim of this policy. Israel will defend its rights, its interests, and its people.”
Israel need not answer every criticism, nor should every response be maximal. But when criticism hardens into policy intended to damage the relationship, Jerusalem should determine which elements of that relationship Britain can no longer take for granted.
That may mean a diplomatic downgrade, exclusion from a particular forum, or a reassessment of specific forms of cooperation. The response should fit the offense and protect Israel’s interests – not merely vent anger.
But this is not your grandmother’s Israel. It is stronger, richer, larger, and less dependent on the goodwill of governments that demand much from it while asking little of its enemies. Its diplomacy should reflect that reality.