Finland fears it will bear the cost of the crisis between the United States and NATO if, and when, American forces are withdrawn from Europe. The Baltic states, as well as Poland, have already criticized the NATO embargo on using the airspace and bases of European countries during the war with Iran. They now understand that the consequences will be far more extensive for the ongoing and prolonged crisis.
The concern is that an escalation of the crisis will lead to a destabilization of the status quo on the Baltic and Finnish fronts. France, which has taken a clear and public stance against the United States, recently initiated a proposal to extend a nuclear umbrella over the Nordic countries. However, in Finland, there are also concerns that declarations are one thing, and reality is another.
This is especially true as threats grow and the erosion of European deterrence could lead to prolonged conflict below the threshold of open war on the Baltic and Finnish fronts, including airspace disruptions, incursions by unmanned systems, and continued cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure. Finnish border guards recall the use of migrant “pushing” at border crossing points with Russia, and the entry of migrants through open crossings along the more than 1,000 km. border.
In Finland, there are fears that countries such as France may refrain from escalating any deterrent steps, even if Finland’s border region becomes more violent. As a result, even France’s proposal to deploy nuclear missiles has been received in Helsinki with cautious approval. However, it still does not convince the leadership that it would provide sufficient deterrence in Northern Europe.
Providing deterrence in Northern Europe
RECENTLY, FINNISH security officials announced that they anticipate a significant increase in the strengthening and expansion of bases along the border with Russia. This marks a reversal of a temporary reduction in presence in the border area, with force deployment and base distribution now being recalibrated in response to the deteriorating security environment.
This shift helps explain why Alexander Stubb, the president of Finland, foresaw the implications for his country at the outset of the war in Iran. He stated that “capable” countries should send forces to assist in opening the Strait of Hormuz, a move that effectively constitutes a “trial by fire.” He added that this should be a “coalition of the willing,” acknowledging that the crisis could worsen at the expense of the alliance’s newest member.
Despite the good personal relations between Stubb and US President Donald Trump, there is genuine concern about a long-term loss of European deterrence, alongside a series of US moves that will require Finland to accelerate plans for broader and more reliable defense capabilities.
Across Europe as well, countries are engaged in a rapid arms race and a shift in military procurement, in light of grim forecasts for a prolonged confrontation. Finland has acquired the Israeli-developed David’s Sling air-defense system and is interested in additional systems. Additionally, Finland and Israel have publicly agreed to work together to strengthen relations between the two countries – an outcome of Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen’s visit to Israel in February, when she met with Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar.
ALTHOUGH A major NATO exercise in Northern Europe has also been conducted in Finland with combined ground forces, the European umbrella has not yet been prepared for all possible scenarios in border regions, particularly in the Gulf of Finland. Frictions in the Baltic Sea are becoming increasingly frequent, and civilian vessels, sometimes camouflaged, are also operating in the area, potentially for the purpose of damaging energy infrastructure.
In Finland, there is also an understanding that spillover from the war in Ukraine places the nation in a sensitive test period vis-à-vis Russia. Unmanned aerial vehicles attributed to Ukraine that fell on Finnish territory demonstrated how the willingness to use Finnish airspace has become a test of resolve. The Finnish military scrambled fighter jets to identify and track the drones, but did not shoot them down, and they eventually crashed near the city of Kouvola.
The knowledge that Russia maintains important strategic bases on its northern side near the Finnish border increases fears of spillover into Finnish territory. A similar concern regarding spillover into the Arctic region is also not unfounded, as Ukraine succeeded in June 2025 in striking Russian facilities on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic.
At present, Finland may increase its military presence and readiness, as the country operates a conscription system and can rapidly mobilize the relevant age cohorts. However, the question of readiness has not yet been tested in practice. In parallel, Finland may hope that in the event of crises, it will be able to obtain separate security guarantees from the United States by assisting the Americans in the Arctic domain, including surveillance and military support.
They may also be able and willing to provide coverage via space stations in the Arctic region, while safeguarding critical communication networks in Europe that support the satellite infrastructure. Finland has also committed to building icebreakers for the United States amid the great-power competition over securing northern shipping routes, and it is interested in establishing a joint air-defense shield with the Baltic states.
THE FINNS are conducting a calculated risk-management strategy and maintaining a firm diplomatic tone toward Russia while tightening coordination with European leadership. However, fractures within the military alliance will require Finland to recognize the need to maintain an open and reliable channel with Washington, and to coordinate Arctic defense planning with the Americans as an incentive to preserve close relations, similar to the British and Norwegian model in the North Sea.
During Stubb’s visit last month to Washington, he emphasized that the Americans are justified in their demand that Europe assume greater responsibility for its own security. He also noted the need for Europe to develop independent core capabilities in the fields of space and long-range weapon systems.
Finland joined NATO with the expectation that breaking with its traditional long-standing policy line would grant it an American and European security umbrella. However, this framework has not yet been tested under fire, and Finland is required to maneuver under commitments of conventional European forces for support, while the United States may drift away from the Transatlantic Alliance following a series of crises, including the issue of Greenland.
While leaders of major European states navigate and manage relations with the United States according to their national interests, Finland expects to deepen its frameworks for international cooperation within an evolving international system, to avoid the tragic maxim attributed to Thucydides: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”
The writer is a research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Center at Bar-Ilan University and the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.