Israel’s justice minister is undermining judicial independence and the rule of law - opinion

Since the 2022 elections, Israel has faced the most serious constitutional crisis in its history. Justice Minister Yariv Levin has launched a sweeping campaign to curb judicial independence and expand political control over the courts.

No previous justice minister has shown such hostility toward the judiciary or such disregard for the public’s need for a functioning, impartial legal system. The paradox could not be starker: the nation’s top legal guardian has become the judiciary’s chief antagonist.

Levin has openly challenged the judiciary’s leadership. He refused to recognize Justice Isaac Amit as president of the Supreme Court, calling the appointment “fundamentally flawed and illegal,” and instructed officials not to include Amit in major state ceremonies, including the Knesset’s 60th-anniversary celebration.

At the same time, Levin has promoted radical structural reforms: giving politicians control over the Judicial Selection Committee; introducing an override clause allowing the Knesset to reenact laws struck down by the Court with a simple majority; abolishing the “reasonableness” standard used for judicial review; and weakening the attorney-general. Together, these measures would sharply reduce judicial oversight and centralize unprecedented power in government hands.

The most damaging step has been Levin’s refusal to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, the body legally required to appoint judges. This refusal has produced a genuine constitutional crisis. Dozens of judicial positions remain vacant, including several on the Supreme Court. Case backlogs have ballooned, criminal trials face long delays. In some cases, defendants accused of serious offenses have been released because no judges were available. Civil litigants wait years for judgments, effectively losing their right to justice. The system’s capacity to deliver timely, fair adjudication has been severely compromised.

Judicial independence exists not to protect judges, but to protect citizens, especially those lacking political power.

When courts fail to function, victims, families, defendants, and small businesses suffer first. Access to justice is the backbone of democratic life.

Levin’s refusal to convene the committee is not administrative oversight but rather a strategic power play. By freezing judicial appointments, he has effectively suspended a core function of the state. A court system without judges cannot operate; a justice system without courts cannot deliver justice.

More troubling is Levin’s uncertainty about whether he would obey a Supreme Court order requiring him to convene the committee. His response, “we will wait and see,” creates unprecedented dangerous constitutional ambiguity. Democracy depends not only on legal rules but on expectations of compliance. When the justice minister hints that court rulings are optional, the rule of law becomes negotiable. If the government chooses which judgments to obey, law collapses into politics.

This confrontation is part of a broader project to remake Israel’s constitutional order: politicizing judicial appointments, enabling parliamentary override of court decisions, limiting judicial review, and weakening legal advisers. In a system without a constitution, these measures remove essential restraints on majority power and pave the way for the “tyranny of the majority,” long warned of by me together with many democratic theorists.

Levin justifies his actions as fulfilling “the will of the people.” But democracy is not simply majority rule; it is majority rule constrained by minority rights, impartial courts, and institutional safeguards. Elections grant authority; they do not grant permission to dismantle constitutional protections.

Reform of the judiciary is not inherently illegitimate; democracies routinely adjust institutional arrangements. But legitimate reform requires dialogue, consensus, and respect for the separation of powers. A justice minister may advocate change, but he may not disable the legal system until his preferred reforms are enacted.

What makes this moment extraordinary is the simultaneous pursuit of sweeping constitutional change and a deliberate immobilization of the judiciary. Instead of strengthening institutions, the government has weakened them.

This crisis has deepened social divisions and turned legal disagreements into identity conflicts. Unfortunately, many now view the judiciary not as an impartial institution but as a political symbol. Courts depend on public trust. Once that trust erodes, their authority weakens even if their formal powers remain.

The rule of law depends on restraint: on political leaders respecting institutions that limit their power. When the guardian of the legal system becomes its chief adversary, the question is no longer policy but democratic survival.