How Qatar's former emir Sheikh Hamad reshaped Qatar - and the modern Middle East - analysis

Arab News noted that “Sheikh Hamad, who stepped down in June 2013 after 18 years as emir, was the architect of Qatar’s stunning ambitions that turned it into an international crossroads in less than a generation.”

Qatar had been under British protection since the 1916 Anglo-Qatar Treaty was signed in 1916, and later became fully independent in 1971, in the same era that the UAE and Bahrain received their independence. Other Gulf countries were already independent states, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman.

Qatar’s population enjoyed significant growth during the emir’s rule, fueled by foreign workers and expats who flocked to the kingdom. “Sheikh Hamad was responsible for overseeing the rapid transformation of Qatar into a modern state open to the world,” Arab News noted. He was influential in expanding Doha’s role as an international business hub. Qatar Airways, for instance, was founded in 1993, and over time it became a major airline.

Doha also invested in developing liquefied natural gas, which is important for its economy. The former emir would play a key role in this. As DW news in Germany notes, “in the late 1970s, he was named crown prince and came to power in a bloodless coup in 1995, deposing his father while he was abroad.”

Perhaps more important, Qatar constructed the Al Udeid Air Base in the 1990s, giving US troops a place to move after the 1991 Gulf War ended. At the time, there was controversy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia about the presence of US bases there.

Extremists such as Osama bin Laden used this as one of many excuses to launch a war with the US.

PBS Frontline notes that “from 1992 on, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members stated privately within the organization that al-Qaeda should put aside its differences with Shi’ite Muslim terrorist organizations, including Iran and its affiliated terrorist group Hezbollah, to cooperate against the perceived common enemy, the United States and its allies.

It also noted that the US forces stationed on the Saudi peninsula, including both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, should be attacked; and the US forces stationed in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, should be attacked.” Bin Laden called on King Fahd in Saudi Arabia to expel the Americans. In 1998, he was behind the attack on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

This matters because Doha positioned itself as a place that the US could pivot to. American troops also moved in increasing numbers to facilities in other Gulf countries such as the US naval base in Bahrain and also the UAE and Kuwait. This helped enable the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and also the US war in Afghanistan after 9/11. Qatar thus positioned itself as being indispensable to the US.

Doha became a military partner of the US, and in 2021, Qatar received its first batch of F-15s from the US. For instance, the US Air Force noted in 2020 that “Qatar Emiri Air Force partners with US to gain newest F-15 to their fleet.”

The Air Force noted that “for the United States and US Air Forces Central Command, the ability to conduct and deliver combat airpower alongside partner air forces has increased as its close partner, Qatar, has solidified details and logistics with US government organizations and contractors to procure its own fleet of more than 35 F-15QA fighter jets.

The Qatar Emiri Air Force is scheduled to start receiving these fighter jets in June 2021. The F-15QA is the most advanced version of the F-15 Eagle, the twin-engine fighter jet flown by the US Air Force since 1972.”

It’s difficult to remember now how influential this station became in the region and the world. Doha at this time was angling for global influence. The influence was not merely financial or military. It was also ideological and influenced the Muslim world.

The ideological view of Doha and its view of the region has been described as closely associated with support for the Muslim Brotherhood or similar groups. For instance, Andrew Hammond at the European Council on Foreign Relations noted in a piece, “Al Jazeera betrayed Islamist leanings from the beginning. ‘Al-Sharia wal-Hayat’, a show featuring Brotherhood-associated Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, aired from the channel’s first day.

Al Jazeera also had a strong contingent of Islamist-leaning broadcasters and journalists in addition to Qaradawi, a long-time Doha resident who had developed close ties with the ruling family.” ABC News also notes how the former emir cultivated good relations with Iran and also with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas had come to power in Gaza in 2007 in a coup against Fatah.

It’s hard to remember now how different things were back then. Qatar’s emir visited Gaza in 2012, for instance. At the time, it is likely that Israel believed Qatari investment there might somehow moderate Hamas, or at least buy Hamas off and buy some quiet. This was part of the strategy in Jerusalem at the time.

When the Arab Spring began in 2011, Qatar seized on the opportunity to influence the region. It was pleased to see the Brotherhood rise in Egypt and also in other places. However, it became concerned when the uprisings didn’t lead to stability and new states, but rather chaos and civil war in places such as Libya and Syria.

Hamas leaders such as Khaled Mashaal, who had been living in Damascus, relocated to Qatar at this time, setting in motion some key major shifts in the Gulf.

While Doha was associated with backing rebel groups and playing a key role in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, other Gulf states became concerned. For instance, Saudi Arabia intervened in Bahrain to stop an uprising.

The US was leaving Iraq at this time and also seeking a deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia opposed that deal. The new Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman became a key regional figure, along with the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed.

This eventually led to major shifts in the region, such as the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis in 2015. In 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE led countries to cut ties with Qatar. This was after Thani had abdicated in 2013. He abdicated in favor of his son, then crown prince Sheikh Tamim. Sheikh Tamim was 33 at the time.

It’s worth considering how important it was that young leaders such as Tamim and also MBS in Saudi Arabia took the reins of power in the region. Although MBS is still crown prince, he is seen as managing the day-to-day affairs of the Kingdom and its foreign policy over the last decade.

In some ways, the vision for the Middle East is very stark in terms of contrast between Doha and the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Each has a different vision. More broadly speaking, this dovetails with different visions in Tehran and Ankara. Ankara is a key ally of Doha.

This would pay off during the Gulf crisis of 2017 when Ankara made it clear it would back Qatar and send military personnel if necessary to keep the emirate safe.

The former emir’s regional agenda often ran into problems. Investments in Gaza didn’t change Hamas. In Egypt, the Qataris also agreed in 2012 to plow some $2 billion into the Muslim Brotherhood Government of Mohammed Morsi.

Morsi fell from power in 2013. Doha was not impressed, and later voices in Qatar admitted that the Morsi administration had been inept. As such, Qatar under the former emir invested in many things that didn’t always pay off.

However, in terms of the larger picture, his investments did work. The growth of Qatar’s influence in the region and around the world; the airline, Al Jazeera, and long-term Doha were successful in Syria. In Gaza, though, the work with Hamas did not end well, and it has brought Doha a lot of scrutiny and controversy.

The former emir sought to avoid this limelight of controversy. Qatar’s more activist agenda led to many controversies with neighbors and also in Europe, the US and Israel.

Nevertheless, the overall perception is that he led a small state to punch far above its weight in the world. For instance, media reports note that he was involved in the successful bid that led to Doha hosting the World Cup in 2022.

“Sheikh Hamad had wide-ranging visions for Qatar’s role as a diplomatic broker. Over the years, its mediation was brought to bear on the conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur region, Lebanese factional feuding and the rift between the Palestinians’ Hamas and Fatah factions,” Arab News noted.

Some questions remain. It is not known how much Hamas members in Doha knew about the planning for the October 7 massacre. However, it’s clear that Doha should have warned them against such a disastrous war.

One would assume that had intelligence sharing been better or intelligence in general been better, the October 7 massacre could have been avoided. It was in Doha, Cairo, Jerusalem, and the interests of everyone to avoid this war.

How much did previous Gulf crises and other issues blind countries to this? Qatar might have joined the Abraham Accords under other circumstances. There was a time when it was much more open to ties with Israel in the 1990s and after the Second Intifada. The visit of the former emir to Gaza is an example of what could have been. There were many missed opportunities in this respect.

Israel saw Qatar as a country where it could hold talks and discuss key issues in the region in the past. Prior to the Israel-Hamas War, there were visits to Doha. Israeli officials held talks there in 2020, for instance, according to Arab News. What more might have been done to avoid October 7 is unclear.

What is clear is that today Doha is viewed more negatively in Israel. However, many other countries view Qatar as a key partner.

Qatar has played an important role in mediating many global issues, including the deals that led to the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan when the US withdrew. It has also played a key role in mediation between the US and Iran. This is how Doha positioned itself, and the former emir made much of this possible.