US President Donald Trump made new comments about the Kurds on May 11, when he said that the Kurds had disappointed the administration. He said he was “very disappointed” and accused Kurds of taking and only fighting hard "when they get paid.”
The comments did not specify which Kurdish group he was speaking about, and came after two months of reports about the US backing of Kurdish Iranian opposition groups, including claims that the US sought to transfer weapons to be used against the Iranian regime.
The new comments follow several other times that Trump has been questioned about claims that weapons sent never made it to Iran.
Trump said he was disappointed, apparently referring to weapons transfers involving Kurdish opposition groups. He claimed that only “some guns with ammunition” had been sent and added that the weapons “were supposed to be delivered, but they kept it.”
Trump hinted he had been skeptical from the start about an operation to move weapons into Iran via Kurdish groups. While noting that the Kurds generally enjoy a good reputation in the US Congress, Trump said Kurdish fighters “fight hard when they get paid.”
Trump also expressed doubt that the weapons or the groups involved would ever successfully reach Iran.
The latest comments seem to imply that Trump was skeptical of arguments that Kurdish opposition groups might play a major armed role in fighting the regime. He also seemed to think that any weapons transfers via a group were unlikely to move beyond the group. While Trump spoke broadly about “the Kurds,” no one in the administration has specified which Kurdish group may have received arms.
A lot of the reporting about Kurdish groups since the war began on February 28 has been misleading. For instance, early reports suggested Kurdish Iranian opposition groups had launched an offensive. In fact, they had not.
Later, reports claimed that this information had been leaked. The leaks appeared to dovetail with claims about weapons transfers.
It’s worth noting the complexity of the various Kurdish groups involved. First of all, there are tens of millions of Kurds living in four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurdish areas all border each other, connecting in the mountains, which is the Kurdish homeland. As such, the Kurdish groups in this area all have connections with one another.
Different Kurdish groups have different political affiliations and circumstances in each country
WHERE THERE are major differences among Kurds is primarily in their political parties and the different circumstances they have in each country. For instance, in Iraq, Kurds were subjected to genocide in the 1980s. In Turkey, the government denied that Kurds existed for many years and suppressed their language. In Syria, Kurds didn’t even have citizenship in many cases during the Assad regime era.
Kurds in Iran have opposed the Islamic regime since the 1980s. The Kurds in Iran have also fought for independence since the 1940s. The Islamic regime has assassinated Kurdish leaders over the last few decades.
Many Kurdish opposition groups had to go into hiding. When the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq became an autonomous region, many Kurdish Iranian opposition groups set up camps or small bases there.
The autonomy of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq gave Kurds fleeing Iran some safety, which is important because in the 1980s and 1990s, it had been different; Kurds from Iraq had fled to Iran. The current president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Nechirvan Barzani, lived in Iran for a time.
The Kurdish region of Iraq has other links to Iran.
While the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil tends to have closer ties with Turkey than with Iran, the smaller Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is closer to Iran.
PUK dominates Sulimaniyeh on the border with Iran and is therefore politically and geographically close to Iran. The Kurdish Iranian opposition groups recently formed a coalition. This was accelerated by the protests in December and January.
The coalition brings together the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), the Kurdish Freedom Party (PAK), the Kurdisatan Free Life Party (PJAK), Komala, and Xhabat parties. KDPI and PJAK often claim to be the largest Kurdish Iranian opposition groups. Komala, which had three branches, is also a large party.
The Kurdish parties all have different ideologies. PJAK is a far-left group with links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). KDPI is historically close to the KDP.
While many readers will find this alphabet soup of parties hard to follow, what matters here is that there are many parties. If the US sought to move weapons to one of the groups, or even to the coalition of parties, it would likely be hard to ensure the weapons were evenly distributed.
This would be hard if only the Kurdish army groups were involved. If one were trying to move weapons from northern Iraq, via Kurdish groups, to Iran, the process would be even harder.
There is another factor involved.
The PUK is close to Iran’s leadership and likely opposes any action by Kurdish opposition groups entering Iran from areas the PUK controls. Iran and its IRGC are very active in the Kurdish areas of western Iran. As such, the PUK likely would work to prevent or interdict any operation.
This means moving weapons in this area would be incredibly complex. It would require a lot more than just trucking them to a group and saying, “Here you go.”
Arming rebel groups is complex. It requires knowing the groups, usually setting up infrastructure and camps for training, and having people knowledgeable about the region to make it work. In history, the arming of rebel groups has often not worked, especially when the West has tried to do it.
There are exceptions to that rule.
The Mujahedin in Afghanistan were successful in the 1980s. However, that operation took many years and required support from Pakistan and other countries. In other examples, such as arming the Contras or other groups, things have not gone as planned.
The US does have a successful model in working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria. However, the SDF grew out of an existing group, the People’s Protection Units (YGP), which was highly disciplined.
The US Central Command and Operation Inherent Resolve worked with the SDF to defeat ISIS. This took many years. The US effort to arm Syrian rebel groups was largely unsuccessful. Therefore, it is worth noting that even when the US military, such as CENTCOM or other US elements, is involved, arming groups are complicated.
Trump’s skepticism about the weapons and what might happen is well-reasoned. His blame of the Kurds appears unfair. The Kurds are not one group. There are many groups. When he says that Kurds only fight when paid, he is mistaken.
The Kurdish Peshmerga fought ISIS and received very low pay. The SDF was not well paid, or even paid at all. Therefore, most Kurdish groups have been fighting for decades without pay. The Kurdish Iranian groups that already exist are not being paid.
They live in small, poor, dusty camps and train for years out of devotion to the cause. Whatever comes next in terms of the US and the Kurdish groups will require some attempt to heal the skepticism that has emerged.