Syria, Israel, and the regional war – what lies ahead?

As missiles continue to fly toward much of the Middle East, Syria remained quiet, successfully keeping itself outside of the current conflagration. Its president just completed state visits in Germany and the UK, where he pledged a new and stable Syria that could offer new partnerships in the fields of energy and economy. But all of that might change as Syria itself may vote to join a war after all. 

Thousands of Syrians took to the streets last week in an unprecedented wave of mass protests against Israel, sparked by the Israeli Knesset's approval of a controversial law allowing the death penalty for Palestinian prisoners convicted of terrorism.  From the southern city of Ankhal in Daraa province - and all the way to Damascus,  Homs, Hama, Latakia, Aleppo and Idlib  - armed groups announced a general mobilization against the Israel. Videos circulating on social media showed protesters chanting “The nation wants jihad declared” and calling for the borders to be opened to confront Israeli forces. In Daraa and Quneitra, demonstrators moved toward the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, prompting Israeli forces to fire illumination flares to disperse the crowds. 

The unrest escalated beyond mere street chants. In Damascus, rioters targeted both the U.S. and UAE embassies, causing significant alarm within the diplomatic community. In a formal statement, the UAE called on Syrian authorities to ensure the absolute protection of diplomatic missions and to hold the perpetrators accountable. This campaign, which lasted four consecutive days, bears the distinct marks of an orchestrated pressure campaign designed to corner the new Syrian government and signal possible  support for the Iranian regime and its regional proxies.

What distinguishes these protests from previous demonstrations is the documented participation of Syrian government officials. The official spokesperson for the Interior Ministry was filmed among protesters, while members of the armed forces were also seen participating and inciting the crowds. This official endorsement of popular mobilization represents a significant departure from the government's previously cautious approach to confrontation with Israel. In a striking display of state-sanctioned agitation, the 60th Division of the Syrian Army - headed by trusted ex-HTS commander Awad Al-Jasim - paraded in Aleppo in official military uniform while chanting support slogans for Gaza. This participation of a formal military unit in political protests, signals a significant erosion of the boundary between state military institutions and grassroot activism. Rather than maintaining military neutrality, such involvement raises serious questions about the chain of command and the government's ability - or willingness - to control its own armed forces.

The timing of these protests raises critical questions about who stands to benefit from such mobilization. Israel is currently managing immense pressure on multiple fronts, starting from Iran, continuing military operations in Gaza and tensions with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The emergence of a hostile popular front on Syria's borders adds another layer of complexity to Israel's strategic calculations.

For the Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the protests offer a double-edged sword. On one hand, they allow the new administration to burnish its credentials as a defender of the Palestinian cause and distance itself - especially within its rank and file - from the Assad regime's hollow "resistance" rhetoric. On the other hand, uncontrolled escalation could derail fragile trust-building measures with Israel in southern Syria and jeopardize the delicate security arrangements that have prevented wider conflict. Notably, just days before the protests, President al-Sharaa stated that Syria would remain outside the ongoing Iran conflict "unless Syria is subjected to direct attacks by any party," adding that "14 years of war are enough for Syria.” His government had also recently engaged in indirect and direct negotiations with Israel, claiming to have "reached good points" before Israel shifted its position "at the last minute.” This official stance of restraint contrasts sharply with the street-level calls for jihad.

This current mobilization bears uncomfortable similarities to the events of July 2025, when the Syrian government adopted a notably passive stance during violent clashes in Suwayda, allowing tribal mobilization to inflict irreversible damage on the Druze community before intervening. This pattern of domestic volatility feels hauntingly familiar, echoing the former Assad regime's frequent use of religious extremism and public unrest as tools of blackmail to position itself as the only partner capable of "restoring order.” By allowing or encouraging the current chaos, elements within the new Syrian landscape may be attempting to revive this cynical strategy to extract concessions or redirect international scrutiny away from the fragile transitional order.

Israel - a country with a sizable Druze community of its own - was drawn into that conflict, conducting airstrikes against Syrian government forces moving toward Suwayda and declaring its commitment to preventing harm to the Druze, citing "the deep covenant of blood with our Druze citizens.” The Syrian government's delayed response allowed the situation to escalate to the point of foreign military intervention that included an Israeli bombing of the Syrian Ministry of Defense in Damascus. These events have also fermented Israel’s presence in Southern Syria, a move that became a point of contention between the two countries and which halted the process of political engagement that actually moved forward just prior to July. Overall, this is a scenario Damascus can ill afford to repeat. 

The Syrian government faces a defining test. Rather than allowing protests to be steered by unofficial actors, military units, and potentially radical elements, Damascus must adopt a pragmatic diplomatic posture aligned with the broader Arab consensus; one that rejects the destabilizing 'resistance' doctrine of the Iranian axis in favor of a sovereign, interest-based alignment that mirrors the stability-seeking trajectories of its regional neighbors. In this regard, Jordan provides a strategic blueprint: despite significant domestic pressure, the Hashemite Kingdom has successfully balanced its diplomatic defense of the Palestinian cause with a firm hand on its internal security apparatus. By refusing to allow its military and government agencies to be co-opted by popular mobilization, Jordan has preserved its sovereignty and avoided a direct, devastating confrontation with Israel -  a stability-focused stand that Syria would be wise to mirror.

Damascus must remain wary of becoming a pawn in a broader geopolitical chess match; if the Syrian street is manipulated by Turkish or Qatari interests to pressure Israel into ending its current conflicts, Syria risks its own national project being sacrificed for external agendas. Such a move would inevitably compel Israel to abandon its cautious posture of coexistence in favor of active, devastating countermeasures - particularly in the sensitive southern border regions - thereby dismantling the very stabilization and reconstruction efforts the new government seeks to lead. History serves as a grim warning: for over a decade, the Assad regime allowed Iran to utilize Syrian territory as a strategic launchpad to pressure Israel, a policy that resulted in the systematic erosion of Syrian sovereignty and invited years of Israeli bombardment of military installations. For fragile buffer states caught in the crossfire of great-power conflicts, neutrality has historically proven the most effective strategy. By failing to maintain this distance, the previous regime saw its military backbone broken and its state power fragmented.

Failure to assert control risks severe diplomatic blowback and threats to transform the southern border from a zone of tentative stability into an active front. The presence of armed groups declaring general mobilization and threatening "a new October 7" underscores the volatility of the situation. As one protest banner in Daraa read: "We do not condemn or denounce. We make preparations for battle.”.

Zooming out from this latest sequence of events, it can be argued that Israel and Syria now stand in a much better place than ever before. Iran - Israel's primary reason for hostility in Syria - has been largely pushed out from the country, allowing the border front to remain quiet and enabling Syria to stay away from the current regional war. Syria and Israel also share a common agenda in curbing the influence of the IRGC and Hezbollah, shutting down smuggling routes, and advancing a resolution to the Sweida crisis and the southern border. Additionally, the success of the Syrian DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration) mission led by Al-Sharaa, which aims to integrate the militias into a professional national military and re-establish the rule of law, is the cornerstone for stabilizing Syria and the Levant region writ large. 

Israelis and Syrians have learned to know each other better over the last 15 years through significant civil society and official engagement, some of which continues to this very day. Direct channels already exist between the two governments, and indirect channels continue to work, paving the way for a possible more optimistic scenario of cross-border cooperation. There is much to benefit from an agenda of cooperation between these rival neighbors and from positioning Syria away from the “axis of resistance.” But there is also much to lose. Initial clashes between the IDF and some of the Bedouin tribes in Daraa have the potential for further escalation that will push Syria closer to a war it does not need.

The Syrian government must decide whether it will lead this sentiment or be led by it. The answer will determine whether Syria's first mass anti-Israel protests become a diplomatic tool or a prelude to wider conflict.

Dr. Nir Boms is a Syrian researcher and a Senior Fellow at the Forum for Regional Cooperation, Tel Aviv University. Khaled Homsi, a native of Homs, is a Syrian researcher on transnational security.