If the Gulf states hoped that the US-Iran agreement signed in mid-June would finally bring them lasting calm or a future free from conflict, they were quickly disillusioned.
Rather than easing their worries, the deal US President Donald Trump said he reached recently with the Iranian leadership has left them with the same old “Iran problem,” as some Arab analysts and policymakers say that the core threats undermining stability in the region have not been removed. For many, the Memorandum of Understanding feels more like a lull than a solution.
“The Gulf states after the war will not be the same as before the war. They found themselves at the heart of a conflict that is not their own, so they view this agreement with great caution,” Ahmed Jaafar, a Bahraini political commentator, told The Jerusalem Report in a recent interview.
“The top priority is to prevent a renewed war and to ensure the stability of navigation, energy, and the economy. The expectation is for an agreement that changes Iran’s regional behavior, not just a temporary truce,” he said.
The next conflict
The lack of clarity about how the regional order will take shape after the 60-day negotiations period – if it will reach a resolution within the set time frame – raises more questions than answers, as Iran is widely perceived to have strengthened its position and influence as a dominant regional actor.
“Given the gaps between the sides, the agreement reached is just an interval before the next round of conflict, and the real question is when it will occur,” he said, expressing doubts that the framework of understanding addresses the security needs of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other neighbors of Iran in the Gulf.
While initially welcoming the agreement for its potential to lower tensions, Jaafar and other Arab commentators and scholars told the Report that it does little to relieve ongoing concerns, given the deep mistrust toward Iran, as well as the threat posed by its drones, ballistic missile program, and its continued support for armed groups across the Middle East.
“The recent conflict proved that Gulf security is still directly affected by any Israeli or American Iranian confrontation,” Jaafar said. “The agreement may reduce military strain in the short term, but the final assessment will depend on how committed Iran is to not threaten its neighbors or target maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz,” he explained.
“The current agreement between Washington and Tehran represents only a temporary de-escalation, as the conflict between the two sides [Iran and Israel] is existential,” Jaafar said.
“Israel will accept nothing less than the removal of a regime that has called for its annihilation for nearly half a century,” he pointed out. “Furthermore, it took more than two months to finalize the broad outlines of the ceasefire, making it likely that the major unresolved issues will require even more time to tackle.”
Lack of engagement
The apparent lack of explicit security guarantees for Gulf states, Arab observers said, casts a shadow over the agreement. They also expressed dissatisfaction that, apart from Qatar, which has played a role in mediation efforts, the Gulf countries were not significantly engaged in the talks.
“We do not want to return to the model of previous agreements,” Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center in the UAE, told the Report. “There is a widespread sense that any US-Iranian understandings should not be formulated over the heads of the region’s countries.”
Having been among the states most affected by the war, the UAE wants to be involved in shaping future regional security arrangements, rather than simply being handed the results after decisions are already made, said Al-Ketbi.
The agreement, Al-Ketbi continued, raises the question of reliance on the United States. She said that the war revealed to the Gulf states that the presence of American bases and existing security partnerships do not necessarily prevent these countries from being attacked.
As a result, said Al-Ketbi, the Gulf states are increasingly focused on diversifying security partnerships, strengthening their own capabilities, and building regional arrangements alongside their relationships with Washington.
Enhancing deterrence
Jaafar shares this view, saying, “February 28 and the Iranian aggression are a pivotal point for drawing lessons.”
One of these lessons for the UAE, he said, is to continue enhancing deterrence and military defense measures and security cooperation, while at the same time “keeping dialogue open [with Tehran], but with great caution, as trust has been shaken.”
As for Saudi Arabia, he said: “It will support any agreement that enhances regional stability but will monitor actual implementation, not just accept political promises, especially since the Iranian side is skilled at playing on contradictions, and its words differ from its actions.
“The Saudis will also continue building their defensive capabilities and regional alliances as an additional guarantee,” he added.
Al-Ketbi said that from an Emirati perspective, the priority is not for one side to prevail over the other, but to move from a logic of managing recurring crises to building measures and security frameworks that lead to a more stable Middle East, thereby reducing the likelihood of future wars.
“But this requires that the agreement go beyond the nuclear and economic aspects to also include the broader regional security system,” she noted, referring to the need to tackle key issues such as missiles and proxies. “Otherwise, these sources of tension will remain unresolved,” she said.
“The success of any agreement will be measured by whether it leads to a practical change in Iran’s conduct in the region,” Al-Ketbi added.
New reality
Although encouraged by the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, Jaafar said that Arab states fear Iran might establish a new reality in the vital maritime passageway, either by imposing fees under some pretext or by disrupting navigation in the future.
Other concerns, he said, range from a return to escalation, if the agreement collapses, to giving Iran a financial lifeline through sanctions relief, which “could further destabilize the region’s security.”
They both assessed that the chances of more Arab countries – specifically Saudi Arabia – joining the Abraham Accords soon are unlikely, but that the UAE and Bahrain will maintain their relations with Israel.
“The Gulf states do not have a unified position regarding Israel,” Jaafar said. “The UAE’s stance differs from Saudi Arabia’s, and Oman’s differs from Kuwait’s. Each state will assess its relationship with Israel according to its national interests, not just the Iranian issue.
“Anyone who thinks the war will bring Saudi Arabia closer to Israel is mistaken,” he said. “The Saudis have their own calculations; without a clear path for resolving the Palestinian conflict, Riyadh will not normalize with Israel because the cost of joining the Abraham Accords after the Gaza War has become higher.”■