The illusion of a sovereign Lebanon: Why past agreements keep collapsing - analysis

Negotiations with Lebanon represent an important diplomatic opportunity that could strengthen Israel’s security and reshape regional and, potentially, global stability.

However, based on historical experience, a sober and cautious approach to this is required.

Therefore, alongside advancing negotiations, Israel must continue military operations against Hezbollah to eliminate the threat along its northern border and prevent the organization from exploiting the negotiation process with Lebanon.

This control over core civilian portfolios enables Hezbollah to sustain its dawah system through patronage and recruitment of loyalists, reinforcing its political and social power.

Without dismantling the terrorist organization’s political and military structures, any military gains will remain temporary.

Since the 1960s, Lebanon has remained a structural obstacle to a durable security arrangement, rooted in the deep integration of terrorist organizations in its political system.

Unlike the PLO (1968-1982), which operated as an external terrorist organization, the Amal Movement and Hezbollah (1970s/1980s-present) are embedded within Lebanon’s institutions, despite official narratives that portray them as distinct from the state.

His continued alignment with Hezbollah and Iranian interests, reportedly supported by over $500,000 per month in Iranian funding, indicates sustained integration within the same strategic axis under a political guise.

In the existing structure, the demand to disarm Hezbollah becomes a paradox: the state is required to act against a factor that is itself a partner in the state and in the decision-making mechanisms, including budgets.

State resources that continue to flow, directly or indirectly, to terrorist organizations strengthen their power.

Consequently, under Lebanon’s current parliamentary structure, the government is part of the framework sustaining a radical Shi’ite axis.

While Lebanon benefits from legal international protection as a sovereign state, its official resources are still being channeled to a terrorist organization operating from within its institutions.

Moreover, as agreements are signed with the Lebanese state as a sovereign actor, responsibility is often attributed to Hezbollah, a non-state actor.

Granting access to Hezbollah and the Amal Movement at the center of power undermines trust in the Lebanese government. In practice, the parliamentary alliance with Hezbollah is maintained.

Despite the fact that Hezbollah is officially designated as a terrorist organization in most Western countries, it is not officially designated as such by the State of Lebanon.

Lebanon cannot evade responsibility for the terrorism and human rights violations originating from its territory.

Continued patronage of an internationally active terrorist organization undermines both regional stability and the broader global order.

Senior Lebanese government officials, for one, including Berri, present a pragmatic public stance while simultaneously engaging in rhetoric that delegitimizes the State of Israel.

In addition, demands for an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon – Hezbollah’s stronghold – further cast doubt on Lebanon’s willingness to dismantle the organization.

This, in particular, raises the question of whether Beirut’s political system is structured to restrain Hezbollah, or to preserve its influence.

Lebanon’s Social Affairs Minister, Haneen Sayed, a Sunni who is considered to be “independent,” channeled funds to the Banin Charity Association, which is linked to Hezbollah.

He said that this was aid for displaced Shi’ites from southern Lebanon. Many of these people are Hezbollah supporters.

The key question remains: Who will control these mechanisms after Hezbollah’s military dismantling? Without taking apart its political power, terrorism will not disappear – it will simply change form.

The full dismantling of Hezbollah is a long-term vision that will depend on the implementation of initial stages on which focus must first be placed.

One concerns Hezbollah as a military organization. This must be put to an end, alongside curbing its political power, including that of Berri’s, even at the cost of internal instability in Lebanon.

This effort will require coordination between Israel, the United States, and regional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

France’s intervention in the Lebanese issue did not contribute and may even have caused more harm than benefit.

A decisive component of this strategy would be a comprehensive arms embargo enforced across land, sea, and air routes, including from Syria and Turkey, alongside sustained efforts to disrupt Hezbollah’s global financial and logistical networks.

Drying up Hezbollah’s sources of power, be they economic, logistical, and political, is a more realistic and effective course of action than taking it down by force via the Lebanese Army.

Significantly, this military has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to confront the organization and is partly tainted by cooperation with it.

With this in mind, three initial steps are thereby essential:

1. The establishment of dedicated Lebanese military units separate from the current structure, under the direct authority of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, which will operate in parallel with the existing army units.

2. After Hezbollah and the Amal Movement are removed from Lebanon’s Parliament, an ambitious Marshall Plan-style reconstruction program should be launched under the government’s and presidency’s leadership.

3. The formation of an international coalition to deconstruct Hezbollah’s global financial activity.

Israel’s contribution will be a declaration that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and that it is ready for direct negotiations with Lebanon.

As for the issue of Mount Dov (the Shaba Farms), Israel will not need to compromise on leaving the area because it is not considered part of Lebanon.

However, any Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon must be contingent upon the full dismantling of Hezbollah’s military and political structures.

Only under these conditions can a sustainable arrangement be achieved, one that enables long-term security.

They would also allow for economic, transportation, and infrastructure (like water and electricity) cooperation, as well as for energy collaboration in the Mediterranean Sea and Lebanon joining the Abraham Accords.

Israel will consider a return to the historical international border (the Blue Line) only after Lebanon demonstrates sustained and verifiable long-term security stability.

Without such conditions, an immediate return to the Blue Line could create a security vacuum and further destabilize the region.

In a regional aspiration, a security-strategic alliance with Jordan, and limited cooperation with Syria – if there is proven change in its security behavior – could be developed with Gulf backing and integrated into broader regional frameworks.