The security order stretching from South Asia to the Gulf is changing. Military technology, intelligence services, ideologies, and defense cooperation are now connecting regions that were once viewed separately.

What happens in Kashmir can have consequences for the Gulf. Developments in Iran can alter the security planning of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. And decisions made in China or Turkey can have consequences for the Middle East, South Asia, and ultimately Europe as well.

That is why the growing cooperation between China, Turkey, and Pakistan deserves attention, beyond the conflicts between India and Pakistan and between Iran and Israel.

A recently reported increase in Chinese and Turkish military flights to Pakistan over a period of around 60 hours has raised questions about possible deliveries of defense equipment to Islamabad.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan meets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, ahead of the expected signing of a defence deal between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, August 7, 2026.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan meets Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, ahead of the expected signing of a defence deal between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, August 7, 2026. (credit: Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Turkish Presidential Press Office/Handout via REUTERS)

Indian media, citing security sources, reported that Chinese military transport aircraft repeatedly flew to Pakistani air bases, including Nur Khan near Rawalpindi and Masroor in Karachi. Turkish military aircraft were also reportedly involved.

Drones or other military equipment may have been transported. China, Turkey, and Pakistan, however, have not confirmed any arms deliveries.

The timing is nevertheless noteworthy. The defense relationships between these countries are becoming increasingly close. Concurrently, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7. 

The agreement provides that an armed attack against one of the three countries will be treated as an attack against all three. Interestingly, Iran’s attack on a Saudi infrastructure post Mecca-pact announcement did not produce any actual defense from either Pakistan or Turkey.

A few days ago in fact, Iran was reportedly invited to even join the defense pact.

A multipolar security order is therefore emerging in the Middle East and American influence is increasingly being challenged by nations that are more deeply rooted in the region both geographically and culturally.

Turkey is clearly seeking a greater role. Pakistan brings military capabilities and a strategic location, Saudi Arabia has economic and political clout. China, meanwhile, brings technology, capital, and long-term economic relationships.

Pakistan: More than just a military partner

Pakistan is an important part of this equation. The country has suffered heavily from terrorism. It also has had longstanding links to militant groups that have operated from its territory.

The US State Department has, among others, pointed to the continued presence of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Haqqani Network. Some of these groups have directed much of their violence toward targets outside Pakistan, particularly in India and Afghanistan.

This history is relevant because a militant ideology does not automatically disappear when an organization is banned. Networks can change and continue to exist within religious, political, charitable, or media structures.

Antisemitic and anti-Israel narratives can also be carried forward in this way. When hatred is presented as a religious duty, a connection is created between local conflicts and global extremist movements.

The so-called “mullah system” is therefore not merely a domestic political issue. A narrative that emerges in a mosque, madrasa, or political rally can now be spread around the world within minutes.

Online propaganda against Jews, Israel, Hindus, India, and dissident Iranians is a real problem. Some of these campaigns are also linked to state-backed actors and “proxies.”

As Turkey and Pakistan move closer politically and militarily, this development deserves attention. Pakistan could serve Turkey not only as a defense partner but also as a channel through which anti-Israel or anti-India narratives are spread and amplified, including via social media and bots.

Turkey’s relations with Israel have deteriorated sharply, particularly because of the Israel-Hamas War. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly criticized Israel and supported the Palestinian cause. Ankara also maintains close relations with Hamas leaders.

Turkey and Pakistan countries have also begun working more closely in military terms, including on drones, naval systems, and aerospace technology. Pakistani personnel have  been linked to Turkey’s KAAN fighter jet program.

Turkey has maintained a significant military presence in northern Syria, driven largely by its conflict with Kurdish forces, refugee concerns, and its efforts to shape the country’s post-Assad order.
Turkey has maintained a significant military presence in northern Syria, driven largely by its conflict with Kurdish forces, refugee concerns, and its efforts to shape the country’s post-Assad order. (credit: STOYAN NENOV/REUTERS)

The China Factor: Technology and dependency

China’s role differs from Pakistan’s militant networks and Turkey’s ideological confrontation with Israel. Beijing rarely needs to be loud. China’s influence is growing primarily through technology, infrastructure, supply chains, investment, and long-term dependencies.

China’s influence extends beyond technology and infrastructure. Alongside Qatar, China is also one of the largest foreign funders of American universities.

If Qatar represents the ideological and religious element in a growing red-green constellation of influence, China represents the “red” element. It is an authoritarian state whose influence is increasingly exercised through capital, technology, research partnerships, and long-term dependencies.

While Qatar’s position as a funder of US universities has attracted considerable attention, China ranks second. The lesson is that democracies should keep foreign influence under constant scrutiny, rather than paying attention only when a particular country happens to make the headlines.

Back to Pakistan. As a neighbor of India, Pakistan is one of China’s closest defense partners. The two countries cooperate on fighter aircraft, submarines, and drones, as well as other areas. The jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft is a visible example of this cooperation.

The India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025 also showed how this relationship could matter in a crisis. India’s Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt.Gen. Rahul Singh, stated that China had provided Pakistan with “live inputs” on Indian military positions.

Another detail that received little attention outside India emerged during investigations into the Pahalgam terrorist attack. Indian security agencies investigated the presence of a Huawei smartphone with satellite communication capabilities near the site of the attack. Such devices can enable satellite communications without looking like conventional satellite phones.

China’s role in the Middle East is also well documented. Chinese technology, telecommunications, infrastructure, and supply chains are already deeply embedded in the region. This does not mean that every country using Chinese technology is automatically a Chinese ally. But dependencies can create risks, particularly when the same technology can be used for commercial purposes as well as intelligence or military purposes.

That is precisely why any possible delivery of Chinese military equipment to Pakistan should be watched closely. Even if a specific arms delivery cannot be confirmed, the development itself is strategically relevant.

Not a classic military bloc

Pakistan brings China’s close military and intelligence relationships into this constellation, together with an unresolved legacy of state-sponsored terrorism. Turkey brings regional ambitions, a growing defense industry, and an increasingly confrontational stance toward Israel, while remaining a NATO member and pursuing its own power interests toward Greece and Cyprus.

The danger is not that China will suddenly become the new security guarantor or dominant power in the Middle East. The greater danger is more subtle.

Precisely because this does not look like a classic military bloc, it is harder to recognize as such. Its influence can spread through drones, satellites, aircraft, intelligence services, defense industries, social media, supply chains, and political partnerships.

Dependencies can emerge that gradually limit states’ political room for maneuver. The more closely technology, infrastructure, defense, and strategic supply chains become tied to states whose political interests and values differ from those of democratic societies, the harder it becomes to separate economic decisions from their security consequences.

For the Gulf states, Israel, and Europe, this is the real warning. The next security challenge does not have to appear as a single alliance or treaty.

It can develop step-by-step until technology, intelligence cooperation, and strategic interests become so closely connected that these partnerships can no longer be viewed separately.

The world is now a much broader playing field.

The flood of antisemitic and anti-Israel propaganda should therefore also make people question constantly about the presence of deliberate campaigns run by different players.

It is important to keep track of developments around the world and not take everything we encounter in the media and on social networks at face value.