After 39 days of fighting across multiple fronts, a two-week ceasefire went into effect, a ceasefire that, by all appearances, President Trump pushed for more than any other party involved.
The terms of the ceasefire agreement leave many unresolved questions, not only about the war’s objectives but also about the circumstances at its outset and the conditions under which it is now being paused. The issue highlighted by the White House as a “complete victory” is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Yet this point raises its contradictions because before the war, the strait was open, and it had not been listed among the stated goals of the campaign at all.
It is still too early to offer a full assessment of the war. Negotiations have barely begun, and it remains uncertain whether an agreement will ultimately be signed- and if so, what its terms might be. Even so, the ceasefire creates an opportunity for an interim evaluation. At this stage, the focus should be on reviewing the military achievements, identifying emerging regional shifts, and outlining the key questions and scenarios that will need to be examined once the ceasefire ends.
As mentioned, this war has stretched on for nearly 40 days, longer and far more intense than the previous confrontation with Iran in June 2025 that lasted 12 days and saw roughly 550 missiles launched toward Israel. Yet beyond its duration and scale, this war has also differed significantly in both context and conduct.
This has been a war shaped from the outset by direct American involvement, with the United States acting as a full partner and leading the campaign from day one. It quickly evolved into a regional conflict, with a larger volume of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) directed at Gulf states than at Israel itself. Iran then widened the battlefield even further, extending its attacks toward Europe—including strikes on Cyprus, on the British‑controlled base at Diego Garcia, and on Turkey, a NATO member—as well as toward Asia, with missile fire directed at Azerbaijan.
Alongside the military escalation, the conflict also triggered a global economic confrontation centered on energy resources, particularly oil, with immediate repercussions for international trade and the broader world economy.
The war began as a campaign against an extreme regime, even though its stated objectives shifted repeatedly—from calls for regime change to creating conditions for regime change to the point where, two weeks into the fighting, the White House spokesperson no longer mentioned this goal at all. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) apparently replaced that regime, transforming an extreme religious government into an extreme military one.
Whether this shift is ultimately stabilizing or more dangerous remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the new leadership gained a measure of legitimacy simply by agreeing to a ceasefire and entering negotiations with the United States.
At the same time, a war initially framed as an effort to remove “existential threats,” such as nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile programs, now pauses with only vague references to the 460 kilograms of enriched uranium still in Iran’s possession- raising doubts about whether the campaign can truly end while such material remains.
In effect, two major objectives, both declared and undeclared, remain unresolved at the moment the ceasefire takes hold.
One of the central objectives of the campaign was to reduce the ballistic missile threat, which before the war was believed to consist of over 3,000,000 missiles.
Iran fired over 600 missiles at Israel and hundreds more towards Gulf states, while hundreds of others were destroyed on their launchers and in storage sites, and an additional 600-800 more were in the underground “missile cities.” According to an interview with a Deputy Colonel in Air Force Intelligence, a significant portion of Iran’s arsenal and roughly half of its launchers have been eliminated, with about 1,000 missiles and half of the launchers remaining—marking a major reduction in capability.
Unlike the fighting in June 2025, the Air Force conducted a systematic campaign against the entire missile “value chain,” striking production facilities, engine plants, steel factories that manufacture missile bodies, and laboratories responsible for electronic components. Taken together, these actions ensure that Iran’s ability to rebuild will require years rather than months. The pace of recovery will depend on a range of factors, including Iran’s industrial capacity, political will, reconstruction efforts, and access to funding.
There is little doubt that, in this preliminary assessment, the military effort to reduce the missile threat can be considered successful. Another declared objective was to build on the achievements of June 2025 and inflict deeper, more lasting damage on Iran’s nuclear program, especially amid reports that Tehran had begun restoring parts of the infrastructure previously struck.
Central to this goal was the attempt to secure the remaining stock of 460 kilograms of enriched uranium buried under the ruins of several damaged facilities struck in June 2025.
Before the war, negotiators attempted to include the broader nuclear issue in the discussions, not only the question of enriched material, but also a framework in which Iran would agree to halt all uranium enrichment on its soil and accept comprehensive international oversight of all its facilities.
With the arrival of the ceasefire, it is evident that this objective has not been fully achieved. Much of its substance is still unresolved and will need to be addressed in the negotiations that are just starting.
Although additional nuclear infrastructure was damaged during the fighting and the scope of the strikes expanded to facilities that were either unknown in June 2025 or had since been restored, it is not possible to conclude that the nuclear threat has been fully removed. Leaders spoke confidently in June 2025 about having already neutralized the nuclear threat, so it would be both inaccurate and irresponsible to repeat such assurances now as the ceasefire takes effect.
And so we enter this ceasefire with an interim balance that reflects only partial success relative to the objectives declared at the outset of the war. At the same time, the administration is now highlighting an “achievement” that was never part of the original goals-the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz- even though the situation there is essentially identical to what it was before the fighting began. And despite all that happened, an extreme regime remains in place.
Whether the two‑week ceasefire will ultimately lead to a formal agreement remains an open question. In the coming weeks, it is entirely possible that the ceasefire will be extended, just as it is possible that no agreement will be signed at all and the campaign will simply conclude with a long‑term cessation of hostilities without any signed agreement.
It is also unclear whether the ceasefire truly applies across all fronts, including Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, especially given the gap between official statements and reports from outside Israel. The next few days will reveal whether Israel is now constrained by the partnership it maintained with the United States in initiating and managing the war, and whether this has created a situation in which Israel has limited room to maneuver even in the terms of the ceasefire and the way the war is brought to a close.
Time will tell.
Many uncertainties will follow us in the weeks ahead, and there is no guarantee that the conflicts with Iran or Hezbollah are truly behind us. It is even less certain that the threats—whether distant, from Iran, or close, from Hezbollah- have been fully removed. There is certainly no decisive resolution here and no victory that fundamentally transforms the strategic landscape, even if a significant blow was dealt to Iran’s ability to recover and rebuild.
In the meantime, we must maintain readiness and vigilance throughout the coming two weeks, use the time to refresh forces and equipment, conduct preliminary reviews, draw rapid lessons, and remember that a return to the battlefield remains a real possibility at any moment.
The author is a former Commander of Israel Air Defense Forces.